PKI in Higher Education:Dartmouth PKI Lab Update
Internet2 Virtual Meeting5 October 2001
Internet2 Fall 2001 Meeting: HEPKI
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Researchers
Dartmouth College Computer Science
Institute for Security and Technology Studies
Dartmouth College Computing Services
•David Nicol, Sean Smith: CS/ISTS
•Ed Feustel: ISTS
•Robert Brentrup, Larry Levine: Computing Services
•Yasir Ali, Alex Iliev, John Marchesini, Eileen Ye:CS Students
•Shan Jiang, Evan Knop: Alumni
Lab Created 4Q2000
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Dartmouth PKI Lab Objectives
Exploring how to effectively use public-keycryptography to build trusted informationservices in the real world.
Enable effective trust judgements, in systemsthat are heterogeneous on every level.
•In users, roles, computer hardware and software,organizations, administrative domains, applicationcontexts
What are the appropriate pieces of informationfor trust judgments in different contexts atdifferent times?
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End to End Approach
Server
•How do we establish foundation for this trust, whencomputation is vulnerable to insider attack?
Client
•How can user tools enable effective trustjudgments?
Infrastructure
•How do we deploy and manage the certificates,keys, etc., that enables this trust communication
Applications
•How can applications engage in PKI-based trustjudgments?
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Status, October 2001
Server
•Trusted Third Parties, immune to insider attack
–Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
–Armored Vault
–WebALPS
Client
•Web/SSL/Certificate Spoofing
•Requirements for Secure Web Client
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Status, October 2001
Infrastructure
•Setup COTS, open-source testbeds. LDAP
•Campus PKI planning
–PKI/Lite: Web Authn/Authz & S/MIME
–S/MIME Private Key Server
Applications
•Hardened Box Office
•Web Application authentication/authorizatiolocal replacement
•Voting (demo of WebAlps)
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Private Information Retrieval
Protecting query privacy from insider attack
Server that efficiently provides material toauthorized users…
…so that the server operator learns nothing, noteven statistics!
Domains with sensitive data
•Health information, expensive research data
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Armored Vault
Protecting archived private material from insiderattack
Prove to stakeholders that policy is followed
•Prototype domain: network data
•Archive is encrypted and bound to policy
•Built with Snort and IBM 4758-2
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WebALPS
Protecting SSL Web Servers from insider attack
SSL doesn’t help if armored pipe to cardboardbox!
Move server end of SSL into securer co-processor
Built from Apache, OpenSSL and IBM 4758-2
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Hardened Box Office
Protect operator from liability
Campus agents want to sell tickets, etc. online
Server operator wants to minimize risk ofexposing private customer data
Uses WebALPS hardened server
Internal application catches customer data, thensigns and encrypts for entity and e-mails it
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S/MIME Private Key Server
Protecting user private keys from insider attack andprovides mobility
Problem: Web based e-mail offers client mobility…
… but adding PKI requires trusting the server with theprivate keys
Solution: uses WebALPS- hardened server
Generates, certifies, stores user keys…
… and applies them only when authorized by user
Neither bribery nor subpoena reveals the user keys!
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Client: Good Trust Judgements?
Web/SSL provides server identity, not attributes
•URL?
•Location bar information
•SSL Icon?
•SSL warning window?
•Certificate information?
•Status bar
www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pkilab/demos/spoofing/
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Client Research Questions
•Should attributes attest to name of server, orcontent offered?
•What are semantics of “independent windows”?
•Who is really providing this service?
•Which certificate is being used? Why?
•What information does the server acquire about theuser?
•Requirements for “better” browser
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Infrastructure
Developing Familiarity with tools for applicationdevelopment
Defining strategies to setup and administer institutionscale PKI environment
Interactions with Central LDAP directory
Tools to support Research projects
Compatibility testing of PKI vendors and clientapplications
Studies of end-user behavior, eg. Why passwords areshared
Research goal: real applications, solving real problems!
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Futures
PKI more than X.509
•SDSI/SPKI. PGP, XML...
Trust Judgment in Applications
Rights Management, expressions of policy
Critical Mass, academic community asprototype lab
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For More Information
www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pkilab
Sean Smith
sws@cs.dartmouth.edu
Ed Feustel
efeustel@ists.dartmouth.edu
Robert Brentrup
Robert.J.Brentrup@dartmouth.edu